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INTRODUCTION: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, A FEATURE OF MILITARY SERVICE 
In a recent report released by the Pentagon, an estimated 19,000 
incidents of “unwanted sexual contact” occurred within the United 
States military in 2014.1 However, only 191 service members2 were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Stav Ziv, Report on Sexual Assault in the Military Draws Criticism, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 8, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/report-sexual-
assault-military-draws-criticism-290173; Military Sex Assault Reports Up 8 Percent, 
CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014, 7:37 AM), 
http://politics.suntimes.com/article/washington/ap-sources-military-sex-assault-
reports-8-percent/thu-12042014-726am. 
2 See Naomi Wolf, Rape in the Military a Culture of Coverup, READER 
SUPPORTED NEWS (June 15, 2012), http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/273-
40/11931-rape-in-the-military-a-culture-of-coverup.  Generally, only 17% of rape 
allegations are prosecuted within the military; this is low in comparison to the 
national average of 37% of rapes being prosecuted in the general public. Amy 
Sullivan, Why Won’t the Military Take Troop-on-Troop Rape Seriously?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/plank/109083/why-
wont-the-military-take-troop-troop-rape-seriously. This means that roughly 6% of 	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convicted of such crimes at courts-martial.3 Since the Department of 
Defense (DOD) began recording data on reported incidents of rape 
and sexual assault in 2004, the number of reported assaults has 
increased from 1,700 to 3,374 reported incidents.4 Unwanted sexual 
contact—terminology used to encompass both rape and sexual 
assault—is a prevalent feature of military service in the United States.  
 Rape and sexual assault against service members in the U.S. 
Armed Forces is a well-documented, historical problem that is being 
critically examined by the public and the U.S. Government. In 2012, 
the discussion surrounding the “silent epidemic”5 of rape and sexual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
all incidents were tried and successfully prosecuted. Id. The DOD estimates that 
19,000 sexual assaults occur each year within the military services. Id. In 2011, only 
3,192 cases were actually reported. See Wolf, supra note 2. Furthermore, only 1,518 
of these incidences were recommended for any form of disciplinary action. Id. A 
2012 DOD study similarly concluded that “only 8% of sexual assailants were 
referred to military court, compared to 40% of similar offenders being prosecuted in 
the civilian court system.” Josh Levs & Ashley Frantz, Military Rape Victims: Stop 
Blaming Us, CNN (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:22 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/13/us/military-sexual-assault/index.html. 
3 A court-martial is defined as:  
 
Military court for hearing charges brought against members of the 
armed forces or others within its jurisdiction; also, the legal 
proceeding of such a court. . . . Courts-martial are generally 
convened as ad hoc courts to try one or more cases referred by 
some high military authority. The convening officer chooses 
officers, and sometimes enlisted personnel, from his or her 
command to sit on the court, determine guilt or innocence, and 
hand down sentences. 
 
Court-Martial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/court-martial (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).  
4 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 5 
(2013), available at 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sexual_Assa
ult_in_the_Military.pdf. Fiscal Year 2012 is the most recent fiscal year included in 
this report. 
5 The silent epidemic presents the troubling predicament of victims of rape 
and sexual assault within the military. The epidemic is rooted in a victim’s 	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assault in the U.S. military was reignited with an emerging scandal at 
Lackland Air Force Base (Lackland AFB).6 As the training camp for 
all new Air Force enlistees, Lackland AFB provides opportunity for 
sexual misconduct.7 At Lackland AFB, all enlistees go through boot 
camp where every aspect of their lives is controlled.8 Enlistees vest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compelled choice to remain silent, as filing a complaint or report may endanger 
their career, retirement, and reputation. Alexa M. Poteet, The Military’s Rape 
Problem, NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 19, 2012), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/the-militarys-rape-problem-7492. 
6 Molly O’Toole, As Lackland Air Force Base Scandal Widens, Tailhook 
Whistleblower to Demand Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 3:05 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/lackland-air-force-base-
tailhook_n_1732874.html. 
7 Lackland AFB produces nearly 36,000 new privates and enlisted members 
annually. Paul J. Weber, Lackland Air Force Base Rocked By Sex Scandal, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/lackland-air-force-base-sex-
scandal_n_1626206.html.  
8 Rank and superiority of one officer can allow them to effectively control 
another lower-ranked individual within the military. For example, allegations made 
against Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair included rape and sexual assault. His 
victim, a three-year Captain of the Army, alleged that aside from making threats 
against her life, he also told her how much water she could drink and how often and 
when she could use the restroom. Katie J.M. Baker, ‘Godlike’ Army General 
Allegedly Threatened to Kill Woman if She Reported Sex Crimes, JEZEBEL (Nov. 7, 
2012, 1:40 PM), http://jezebel.com/5958548/godlike-army-general-charged-with-
sex-crimes-allegedly-threatened-to-kill-woman-if-she-spilled-the-beans.  
 
When the chips are down and our subordinates have accepted us 
as their leader, we don’t need any superior to tell us; we see it in 
their eyes and in their faces, in the barracks, on the field, and on 
the battle line. And on that final day when we must be ruthlessly 
demanding, cruel and heartless, they will rise as one to do our 
bidding, knowing full well that it may be their last act in this life.  
 
Alexander N. Pickands, Reveille for Congress: A Challenge to Revise Rape Law in 
the Military, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2425, 2425 (2004).(quoting U.S. Dep't of 
Army, Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do 1-15 (31 Aug. 1999) 
(quoting Colonel (“COL”) Albert G. Jenkins, CSA))).  
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complete trust in their leaders,9 and as a result, a unique relationship 
between enlisted members and military leadership develops.10 This 
relationship is necessary in a military setting because in combat 
leaders may be compelled to command their subordinates to put life 
and liberty on the line for their country.11 However, while this unique 
relationship may be required for combat, it also lays the foundation 
for an environment conducive for sexual violence to take place. 
In order to create this unique relationship, the military employs 
the “break and build” technique while training new enlistees at boot 
camp.12 This training technique refers to the “break down” of an 
enlistee’s mental state by the enlistee’s superiors.13 These superiors 
intend to replace the enlistee’s old mental state with one better suited 
for service in the armed forces.14 Break and build exemplifies military 
structures intended to sustain the unique power structure between 
superiors and subordinates. Such power structures attempt to give 
superiors automatic and complete control within combat situations. 
However, this also gives superiors a blank check of authority over 
subordinates, potentially leaving these individuals vulnerable to 
abuse.15 This level of control of a superior over an employee (enlistee) 
is unmatched by any other organization.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Pickands, supra note 8, at 2425-26. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 The “break and build” mentality has been described as a “frequently employed 
training strategy that some superiors have taken too far.” See Eryn Sepp, Service, 
Not Subservience: The U.S. Military’s Sexual- Violence Problem, DAILY BEAST 
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/08/service-not-
subservience-the-u-s-military-s-sexual-violence-problem.html; see also Emily 
Badger, How the Military Can Change Personalities, Slightly, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 
24, 2012), http://www.psmag.com/blogs/the-idea-lobby/how-the-military-can-
change-personalities-slightly-40069/. 
13 See Badger, supra note 12. 
14 See id.  
15 See Sepp, supra note 12. 
16 Id. 
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 The current dialogue surrounding the silent epidemic is unique 
with respect to the individuals who stand accused of these crimes.17 
Victims of sexual violence continue to make reports against high-
ranking officers,18 despite the fact that pressing charges against such 
individuals can result in extreme forms of retaliation. A number of 
high-ranking officials recently pled guilty to such charges.19 Victims’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 While this relationship is problematic for both male and female trainees alike, 
the most recent line of high profile cases emerging from the American Armed 
Forces is focused on sexual violence against women specifically. As the Lackland 
scandal demonstrates, the stringent conditions of boot camp, coupled with 
psychological reformation, lead women in the armed forces to be frequently 
commanded into situations that lead to rape and sexual assault. LINDSAY 
ROSENTHAL & LAWRENCE KORB, TWICE BETRAYED: BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE U.S. 
MILITARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT PROBLEM 14 (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/MilitarySexualAssaultsReport.pdf (detailing the level of 
rape and sexual assault allegations stemming from abusive conduct from a victim’s 
superior within the chain of command); see also THE INVISIBLE WAR (Docurama 
Films 2012) (portraying cases of servicewomen who were commanded into 
situations that eventually lead to alleged incidents of rape and sexual assault). 
18 For example, Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair faces multiple charges of 
forced sex, wrongful sexual conduct, violating an order, among other charges. 
Michael Biesecker & Lolita C. Baldor, Jeffrey A. Sinclair, U.S. Army General, 
Charged with Forcible Sodomy, Adultery, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2012, 5:12 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/jeffrey-sinclair-
arrested_n_1916919.html. An investigation against Lt. Col. Joseph Morse, the 
Army’s top sexual assault prosecutor, on allegations of making unwanted sexual 
advances towards a lawyer in the Army JAG Corps, were confirmed in March of 
2014. The nature of the charges against this high-ranking individual underscores the 
magnitude of the problem. See Lisa Mascaro, Senate Rejects Stronger Military 
Sexual Assault Bill, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013 5:23 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-military-sexual-assault-
20140307,0,6330638.story#axzz2vUscF7i9.  
19 For example, Army Brig. Gen. Jeffrey A. Sinclair, plead guilty to charges 
including have an illicit affair, impeding an investigation and pressuring female 
officers to send nude photos. Mascaro, supra note 18. However, he pled not guilty 
to the most serious charges alleged against him. Id. These charges include forcing a 
female captain to perform oral sex, groping her, committing sodomy, engaging in 
public sex, and threatening to kill her and her family if she went public with the 
three-year affair. Id. Ultimately, he was not convicted of the most serious charges 	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reports, along with these pleas entered by the accused, highlight poor 
attempts by the U.S. Armed Forces to curtail the sexual violence 
epidemic.20 
In a survey regarding sexual assault reports amongst reserve 
members of the armed forces, 67% of women and 87% of men did not 
report their alleged incidents of rape or sexual assault.21  Reasons for 
lack of reporting included fear of negative responses from the chain of 
command, the alleged attacker, and friends of the alleged attacker.22 
Often individuals who report their attacks after being raped or 
sexually assaulted are not encouraged to seek legal or social help, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and was fined $20,000 as his ultimate punishment from the court-martial. See Gregg 
Zoroya, General Avoids Jail Time in Case Involving Affair with Subordinate, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 20, 2014, 4:24 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/20/sinclair-general-affair-
subordinate-army-sexual-assault/6557033/. Advocates for military justice reform 
called the imposed sentence “a mockery of military justice.” Id.  
20 See Henry Cunningham, Military Focuses on Mission to Bring Justice for 
Sexual Assaults, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Oct. 22, 2012, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.fayobserver.com/military/article_72f6836a-0ed9-53e0-858f-
591174945da2.html. The military’s failure to curb the epidemic of sexual assault is 
particularly disturbing given the lack of any kind of repercussions for perpetrators 
the commit particularly grisly crimes. For example, a female soldier of the Army 
alleged that a fellow soldier raped her and beat her to the point of fracturing her 
skull. Another time, the same soldier tied her to a tree, and raped her again. Her 
claim was met with stern resistance from her chain of command. The advice she 
was given was “not to ‘open this can of worms’” by going forward in pressing 
charges against her attacker. Drew Brooks, Lawsuit Says Military Created 
‘Pervasive Threat’ to Its Own Troops, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://m.fayobserver.com/military/lawsuit-says-military-created-pervasive-threat-to-
its-own-troops/article_265a9d78-62cf-553d-a621-87c5fefa75f7.html?mode=jqm. 
21 It was found that 67% of women and 78% of men did not report these 
instances of unwanted sexual behavior for fear of being labeled by others as a 
troublemaker and for fear of retaliation from others, among other reasons. Jessica L. 
Cornett, The U.S. Military Responds to Rape: Will Recent Changes Be Enough?, 29 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 99, 109 (2008) (citing RACHEL LIPARI, ET AL., DEF. 
MANPOWER DATA CTR., DMDC REPORT NO. 2005-010, 2004 SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT SURVEY OF RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS v (2005)).  
22 Id.  
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are punished through intimidation or isolation.23 Victims are also 
commonly threatened with or actually dishonorably discharged from 
service.24 
This Note will address the present type of retaliation in the form 
of professional disciplinary action against rape sexual assault victims 
in the American military. This Note recommends a new infrastructure 
for responding to allegations of professional retaliation in these 
circumstances. This new infrastructure, described infra, would 
provide enough time for the alleging individual to seek out the 
assistance of criminal investigation units and Judge Advocate 
Generals (JAG), giving alleging individuals access to the criminal 
justice system before professional retaliation and discharge occur. 
While progress is being made in both the executive and legislative 
branches regarding reporting mechanisms, this form of protection is 
currently lacking within the military justice system at large.  
Part I of this Note explores the history of the rape and sexual 
assault epidemic within the American military and the jurisprudence 
of military courts charged with adjudicating such claims. The 
jurisprudence of the military courts demonstrates that when rape and 
sexual assault cases are properly allocated to military tribunals, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jesse Ellison, Service Members Sue Defense Secretary Over Alleged Military 
Rapes, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/28/service-members-sue-defense-
secretary-over-alleged-military-rapes.html. 
24 However,  
 
The federal Servicemember Mental Health Review Act, currently 
under bicameral consideration as H.R. 975 and S. 628, seeks to 
expand review of disability determinations of veterans discharged 
with a personality disorder or adjustment disorder. If enacted, this 
legislation will require that an expanded Physical Disability Board 
of Review include at least one psychologist and one psychiatrist 
independent from the military. Further, the Board would have the 
authority to review discharges of veterans who did not request 
review, upon the veterans’ consent. 
 
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 43. 
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military courts are willing to impose harsh penalties on service 
members that perpetuate rape and sexual assault. Unfortunately, the 
military authority has yet to apply such precedence on its own without 
judicial interference. This section includes an overview of military 
leadership and federal government responses to military victims’ 
claims of sexual assault. These responses highlight the improper 
treatment of victims and the victims’ need for access to courts-martial 
adjudication. 
 Part II assesses the problem of rape and sexual assault within 
the U.S. Armed Forces currently. This section explores new issues 
arising from the harsh treatment of victims while examining 
contemporary calls for reform. 
 Part III introduces “ALARM,” a model framework for 
deterring harsh professional retaliation in response to rape and sexual 
assault reports filed in the military. The Military Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1988 (MWPA), revised in 1998, serves as a guide 
from which an effective model framework can be constructed.25 The 
ALARM model framework differs from current legislation introduced 
in Congress, like the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA) and 
amendments to the U.S. military personnel policy, passed in 2013.26 
While both the MJIA and personnel policy changes advocate for 
similar results, ALARM calls for a more active role for the JAG 
Corps in fielding complaints and further stresses the need to protect 
service members from harsh personnel action and retaliation as these 
acts can have serious consequences even after being dismissed from 
the military. Additionally, ALARM is a progressive model that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2012). 
26 See Ed O’Keefe, Congress Approves Reforms to Address Sexual Assault, Rape 
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protects the interests of military service members while paying 
necessary deference to command leadership.27   
This Note will end by presenting general conclusions about the 
culture of rape and sexual assault in the American Armed Forces and 
the urgent need for reform.  
I. THE HISTORY OF COMMANDED SILENCE IN THE AMERICAN ARMED 
FORCES 
The Lackland AFB scandal is not the first of its kind. The 
American military has endured a number of similar high profile 
scandals throughout the years in almost every military branch and 
academy.28 A review of this troubled history indicates that these 
scandals are prevalent in recent U.S. military history and are often 
ignored. 
A. And Aberdeen, Too: Previous Scandals in the Military 
In 1991, officials discovered the gravity of what is now 
remembered as the Tailhook Incident of the Navy.29 At the Tailhook 
Convention—a professional convention for Navy aviators hosted in 
Las Vegas—officers sexually assaulted more than eighty women.30 
Senior leadership implicated 117 officers of the U.S. Navy for sexual 
misdeeds and conduct unbecoming of an officer.31  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This balance is especially important given the harsh criticism of Senator 
Gilibrand’s approach to this issue. In her attempts to uproot jurisdiction of military 
leadership in these issues, her legislation, the MJIA, ultimately failed when voted 
upon in Congress. See Mascaro, supra note 18. Many cited her lack of deference to 
command leadership as the main source of its failure. 




30 Id.  
31 Id. 
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Five years later, at the Army’s Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 
dozens of female trainees were sexually harassed. Allegations 
included accusations of forcible rape and sodomy over long periods of 
time.32 Investigations revealed a “rape ring”33 that consisted of Army 
officers who raped trainees at the training camp.34  
Preceding the current scandal at Lackland AFB, the Air Force 
Academy endured a similar widespread scandal. In 2003, 
investigations of the Academy unveiled several dozen incidents of 
sexual assault.35 While the investigation revealed that most of the 
claims made by cadets had been appropriately discarded by the 
Academy,36 internal reviews produced by the Pentagon also revealed 
that widespread ignorance to the severity of the problem contributed 
to the enduring situation within the Academy.37 In retrospect, it seems 
as if the Academy did not take victims’ allegations of rape seriously 
until the government began to scrutinize the increasing number of 
rape and sexual assault claims.38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Kingsley R. Browne, Military Sex Scandals from Tailhook to the Present: The 
Cure Can Be Worse than the Disease, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y, 749, 771 
(2007). 
33 Conduct within the rape ring included rape, sodomy, and sexual assault of 
multiple women by a single commanding authority. Delmar Simpson, one officer 
alleged to have been involved in the widespread sexual harassment at Aberdeen, 
was charged with “forcible sodomy, indecent acts . . . indecent assault, and 
maltreatment of a subordinate.” Army Charges Aberdeen Drill Sergeant with New 
Rape Counts, CNN (Dec. 20, 1996, 7:10 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/1997-01-
03/us/9612_20_briefs.pm_army.rape_1_sexual-assault-indecent-assault-sexual-
harassment?_s=PM:US. 
34 Newsweek Staff, Rape In The Ranks, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 24, 1996, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/rape-ranks-176260. 
35 Browne, supra note 32, at 777-78. 
36 Id. at 778. 
37 Mark Mazzetti, Air Force Officials Blamed in Sexual Assault Scandal, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/08/nation/na-airforce8. 
38 See Diana Jean Schemo, Rate of Rape at Academy Is Put at 12% in Survey, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/29/us/rate-of-rape-
at-academy-is-put-at-12-in-survey.html (“After initially playing down the 
complaints of rape victims as the result of a few ‘bad apples,’ Air Force officials 
gradually concluded that the problem was more serious.”). 
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 Statistics dating back to 1995 corroborate the narratives 
provided above. In a report released by SAPRO for the 2012 Fiscal 
Year (FY2012), “an estimated 26,000 cases of unwanted sexual 
contact and sexual assaults occurred in FY2012, a 37% increase from 
FY2011.”39 Within that same report, 50% of female service members 
indicated that they did not report their alleged assault in the belief that 
no one would help them and nothing would be gained from it.40 
Additionally, in a 2004 DOD survey, 19% of female service members 
and 3% of male service members reported experiencing behavior that 
constituted sexual harassment.41 The survey indicated 67% of women 
and 78% of men did not report these instances of unwanted sexual 
behavior out of fear of being labeled as troublemakers. They believed 
the behavior was not important enough to report or they indicated that 
they handled the situation themselves.42 Individuals also remained 
silent out of fear of retaliation.43 Such fears are not unfounded. 
Individuals who report their attacks after being raped or sexually 
assaulted are commonly punished through the use of intimidation, 
isolation, and retaliation.44  
B. Seeking Justice: Rape and Assault in the Military Courts 
The rhetoric surrounding sexual assault in the military justice 
system differs significantly from civilian rhetoric. Military regulation 
of consensual relationships reflects values that minimize the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice Improvement Act, 
OFF. SENATOR GILLIBRAND, http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia (last visited Jan. 
30, 2015). 
40 Id. 
41 RACHEL LIPARI, ET AL., 2004 SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY OF RESERVE 
COMPONENT MEMBERS iv (2005), available at 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/2004-Sexual-Harassment-Survey-of-
Reserve-Component-Members.pdf. 
42 Id. at v.  
43 Id. 
44 Ellison, supra note 23. 
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protection of service members’ sexual autonomy. 45  The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which governs acts of consensual 
sexual conduct, codifies these values. UCMJ regulations include bans 
on adultery and fraternization. 46  Consequently, charges of sexual 
assault and rape are frequently lumped together with cases involving 
adultery and fraternization, potentially couching more violent crimes 
as lesser charges.47  For example, the way in which the military 
regulates the professional and personal lives of service members can 
result in an alleged rapist being placed into the same category as an 
adulterer.48 This distracts public attention from the real issue of sexual 
violence against another. Furthermore, the conflation of consensual 
and coercive acts generates large amounts of skepticism regarding the 
veracity of victims’ claims.49 The manner in which the military is 
structured, coupled with the manner in which the military regulates 
itself, commonly leaves victims and perpetrators of sexual assault on 
the wrong side of justice.  
However, a victim whose case is adjudicated in a military 
tribunal does not face the same diminishment of rights. Adjudication 
of sex crimes within the military is distinct from civilian prosecution 
of the same crimes. The American military is judicially unique, with a 
distinct system of courts, criminal law, and criminal procedure.50 
Review of military courts’ precedent suggests that the military 
judiciary does not diminish the rights of rape and sexual assault 
victims. Rather, adjudicators in cases that are prosecuted in military 
courts show surprising deference to victims of rape and sexual assault 
in their reasoning and holdings. In FY2012, the DOD reported 3,374 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and 
the Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305, 360 (1998). 
46 See id. 
47 Id. at 320. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 321. 
50 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2012). 
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sexual assaults in the military.51 Though only 8% (approximately 255) 
of the alleged perpetrators were eventually prosecuted, in 191 (74.9%) 
cases the court ruled in favor of the victim.52 Of the 191 perpetrators 
who were convicted, 122 were discharged from the military, and 148 
were sentenced to jail.53 
C. Statutory Interpretation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) Definition of Rape 
Rape, as defined by the UCMJ, requires that the act was 
committed by force and without consent.54 The exact statutory 
language of the UCMJ provides: 
 
(a) Rape. Any person subject to this chapter who 
commits a sexual act upon another person by— 
(1) using unlawful force against that other 
person; 
(2) using force causing or likely to cause death 
or grievous bodily harm to any person; 
(3) threatening or placing that other person in 
fear that any person will be subjected to 
death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping; 
(4) first rendering that other person 
unconscious; or  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL 
ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY FISCAL YEAR 2012 58 (2013), available at 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY12_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_
Sexual_Assault-Volume_One.pdf. 
52 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 77 (“91 subjects 
convicted on a sexual assault charge at court martial; 12 subjects convicted of some 
other misconduct charge at court martial”). 
53 Rape, Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the Military, SERVICE 
WOMEN’S ACTION NETWORK (July 2012), http://servicewomen.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Final-RSASH-10.8.2012.pdf.  
54 See 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2012). 
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(5) administering to that other person by force 
or threat of force, or without knowledge or 
consent of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or 
other similar substance and thereby 
substantially impairing the ability of that 
other person to appraise or control conduct; 
is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct.55 
 
Within the context of the statute, force can be understood in its 
traditional sense: the physical exercise of control over the dominion 
of another, and demonstration of a struggle or lack of will by the 
victim. Military courts have held that resistance of a victim must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.56 While the plain language of the 
statute implies that a perpetrator must use actual physical force 
against his victim to be found culpable, military courts find that that a 
perpetrator who employs constructive force may also be found 
culpable under the statute.57  
A finding of constructive force is generally determined by the 
specific circumstances in each case.58 An assailant uses constructive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Id. 
56 Pickands, supra note 8, at 2431-35. In describing the various contexts in 
which resistance by a victim can be interpreted by a court-martial, Pickands notes: 
 
Although the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) states that a 
victim's failure to “make lack of consent reasonably manifest by 
taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the 
circumstances” can give rise to an inference that the victim 
actually consented, the courts have stated that resistance is not the 
only means to show lack of consent. 
 
Id.at 2432 (citations omitted). 
57 See United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 6 (C.M.A. 1987) (citations omitted).  
58 “All the surrounding circumstances should be considered in determining 
whether a woman gave her consent, or whether she failed or ceased to resist only 
because of a reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm.” Id. (citing MCM, 
supra note 54, at ¶199(a) (1967)).  
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force where a victim could reasonably conclude that further resistance 
would not benefit her and could, in fact, lead to grievous harm.59 In 
determining whether a victim has been subjected to constructive force, 
courts consider an alleged perpetrator’s authority, among other 
factors. 60  Courts also look to whether the alleged victim had a 
reasonable belief of death or bodily harm.61 The analysis is conducted 
on a case-by-case basis, requiring an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances in order to properly deduce whether constructive force 
was at play. In concluding that constructive force can be used against 
victims, courts have refused to accept certain defenses at face value, 
such as the contention that lack of actual physical force is indicative 
of consent. Similarly, courts have also refused to accept “passive 
acquiescence” as indicative of consent.62 Further, courts have held 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Id.  
60 Id. The specific holding in Hicks was made with respect to the unique 
relationship between a Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) and trainees. However, 
similar logic has been applied to other cases where a perpetrator’s rank has been 
above that of the victim. See United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432, 436 (C.M.A. 
1992); United States v. Bradley, 28 M.J. 197, 200 (C.M.A. 1989) (“We hold . . . that 
this military relationship . . . created a unique situation of dominance and control 
where explicitly threats and displace of force by the military superior were not 
necessary.”). Other findings include:  
 
(1) the appellant's physically imposing size; (2) his reputation in 
the unit for being tough and mean; (3) his position as a 
noncommissioned officer; (4) his actual and apparent authority 
over each of the victims in matters other than sexual contact; (5) 
the location and timing of the assaults, including his use of his 
official office and other areas within the barracks in which the 
trainees were required to live; (6) his refusal to accept verbal and 
physical indications that his victims were not willing participants; 
and (7) the relatively diminutive size and youth of his victims, and 
their lack of military experience. 
 
United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674, 707 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) aff'd, 58 M.J. 
368 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 
61 See Simpson, 58 M.J. at 378–79.   
62 Id. at 377. 
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that such passive acquiescence, created by an accused’s superior rank, 
cannot be used to force an individual into sexual acts in lieu of actual 
force; if a victim “fear[s] for her life…fear[s] grievous bodily injury, 
and [] believe[s] that resistance would be futile,” the constructive 
force doctrine would apply.63 Such use of rank over the victim, in lieu 
of actual force, cannot act as a recusal to the crime of rape or sexual 
assault.64  
The courts’ willingness to engage in this intense case-by-case 
analysis, demonstrates that the military judiciary recognizes that a 
plain assessment of actual, physical force is insufficient to adequately 
assess rape and sexual assault within the U.S. Armed Forces. Given 
the unique power dynamic of superior and inferior officers and 
soldiers, it is clear that force cannot be limited to the physical restraint 
of another. Extending this reasoning, the adoption of constructive 
force in military jurisprudence suggests that courts have initiated their 
own battle against this behavior, and in “slowly and methodically 
eliminat[ing] the requirement for force,” military judges have arrived 
at a more flexible, consent-based standard.65 Courts rely upon Article 
120 of the UCMJ, which in no part explicitly provides for a finding of 
constructive force.66 Rather, courts read constructive force into the 
language of the statute sua sponte. 
Once convicted by courts-martial, sentencing for convicted 
service members can be substantial and can include jail time, 
discharge, reductions in rank, and forfeiture of pay and benefits.67 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See Clark, 35 M.J. at 436.  
64 Id.  
65 Jennifer S. Knies, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ’s 
Rape Law Missed the Mark, and How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put It 
Back on Track, ARMY LAW. 1, 14 (Aug. 2007). 
66 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012). Courts also rely upon the following articles: id. § 892 
(“Failure to Obey Order or Regulation”); id. § 925 (“Forcible Sodomy; Bestiality”); 
id. § 927 (“Extortion”); and id. § 928 (“Assault”). 
67 Sentences from military courts include: (1) ten years confinement, partial 
forfeitures of pay, reduction in rank, and dishonorable discharge, United States v. 
Williamson, 24 M.J. 32, 32 (C.M.A. 1987); (2) dishonorable discharge, confinement 
for twenty-five years, total forfeitures, and reduction in rank, United States v. 	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courts’ willingness to make findings of constructive force coupled 
with the courts’ willingness to impose stiff penalties on offenders 
suggests a victim-friendly judicial temperament. Unfortunately, even 
with this temperament, the culture of rape and sexual assault in the 
military still remains a prevalent and disturbing issue. 
D. The “Blissful” Ignorance of the Bureaucracy: Responses of 
Military Leadership and the Federal Government 
Some suggest that the position of military leadership on the 
issue of sexual violence in the military is one of deliberate 
ignorance.68 This position has compelled the DOD to institute a new 
method for victims to report such allegations. This reform includes 
two forms of reporting rape and sexual assault: restricted reporting 
and unrestricted reporting.69  
Restricted reporting, also known as the “confidential reporting 
option,” allows a victim to make a report of sexual assault or rape 
without disclosing his or her identity.70 While this allows the victim to 
receive services available to sexual assault victims, the military will 
not notify authorities of the complaint; there will be no investigation 
into the allegations.71 This reporting policy ensures that victims who 
would otherwise be dissuaded from reporting incidents for fear of 
exposure will still receive necessary medical and social services.72 In 
contrast, unrestricted reporting requires a victim to reveal his or her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 370 (C.A.A.F. 2003); (3) confinement for thirty years, 
forfeiture of all pay, reduction in rank and a dishonorable discharge, United States v. 
Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 4 (C.M.A. 1987); (4) confinement for seven years, reduction to 
lowest enlisted rank and a dishonorable discharge, United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 
432, 433 (C.M.A. 1992); and (5) eight years confinement, total forfeitures, 
reduction in rank and a dishonorable discharge, United States v. Bradley, 28 M.J. 
197, 198 (C.M.A. 1989). 
68 See O’Keefe, supra note 26. 
69 See Cornett, supra note 22, at 110. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
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identity in the event that military authorities are contacted to conduct 
an investigation into the victim’s allegations.73 
In addition to reformed reporting mechanisms, the U.S. Armed 
Forces published guidelines and suggestions for conduct between 
military personnel. While seemingly dated, these methods were put 
forth to all those serving in the military in hopes of achieving a safer 
culture for male and female service members alike. For example, the 
military has generally recommended that male recruits stay away 
from female recruits in their unit, warning men that women could ruin 
their career. 74  Other policies implemented by military leadership 
include the “buddy system.” Under this approach, male recruits may 
only speak with female recruits if an additional female is present.75 
Additionally, Congress has made attempts to make this military 
problem, once limited to the ranks of the military, known to the 
general public. The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
requires the DOD to report incidents of sexual assault to Congress.76 
This Act was the first time the legislature required the DOD to report 
incidences of sexual assault, intended to serve as a method of 
accountability.77 Under this legislation, the DOD must report the 
number of assaults (of those that are actually reported), whether 
action was taken against the offender, and if no action was taken, 
what reasoning was given for not doing so.78 Since 2005, the number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 It is interesting to note that of the literature produced by military aid groups, 
such as the Military Rape Crisis Center, a significant portion of the literature is 
dedicated to the benefits of restricted reporting and prohibiting the identification of 
the victim. Restricting reporting and prohibiting identification make the victim 
invisible from the criminal justice and administrative perspective, making it seem 
like the rape or assault never occurred. Additionally, literature provided to victims 
does not thoroughly discuss benefits of unrestricted reporting. See, e.g., Reporting 
Option, MIL. RAPE CRISIS CENTER, http://www.militaryrapecrisiscenter.org/for-
active-duty.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).  
74 Chamallas, supra note 45, at 316-17. 
75 Id. at 317. 
76 See Cornett, supra note 22, at 104. 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
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of sexual assaults reported within the military has increased 
annually.79 
1. Beyond Reporting Reform 
 The ineffectiveness of the aforementioned measures 
implemented became apparent to the DOD in light of the new 
allegations at Lackland AFB. Thus, in 2012, Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta issued multiple reports urging military leaders to take a 
firm stance against rape and sexual assault within the armed forces.80 
  Of the many policy changes Secretary Panetta made during his 
tenure at the DOD, one of the most proactive resolutions he proposed 
was the immediate transfer of female service members that had 
suffered a sexual assault.81 Secretary Panetta also stated that the most 
senior commanders within the unit should handle reports of rape and 
sexual assault. He stated that the senior commanders will “exercise 
greater responsibility in bringing [the perpetrator] to justice.”82  
 However, any hope of continued progress from the DOD is 
unlikely. Secretary Panetta stepped down from his post in early 
February 2013. 83  After leaving, Panetta criticized the military’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 5. 
80 See Karen Parrish, Panetta: Leaders Must Stand Against Sexual Assault, AM. 
FORCES PRESS SERVICES (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118042.  
81 Id. With the emphasis placed upon female service members, it is unclear as to 
whether this transfer provision would apply to all victims of rape and sexual assault, 
including men. 
82 Id. It should be noted, however, that in the case of Brigadier General Sinclair, 
one of his victims specifically requested a unit transfer from one of the most senior 
commanders within the Army—Sinclair himself. His response was to expose 
himself to her, demand oral sex, and listen to her cry throughout the entire assault. 
Baker, supra note 8. 
83 Panetta Steps Down After Four Decades in Politics, EURONEWS (Feb. 9, 2013, 
8:46 AM), http://www.euronews.com/2013/02/09/panetta-steps-down-after-four-
decades-in-politics/. 
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lackluster approach to rape and sexual violence.84 He stated that 
military leadership continuously “looked the other way,” rather than 
actually pursuing convictions.85 His successor, Chuck Hagel, applied 
a number of responses in order to address the culture of rape and 
sexual assault. 86  Such responses have involved, “including the 
examination of gender-responsive and appropriate military culture, a 
review of alcohol policies and sales, the evaluation and improvement 
of sexual-assault prevention and response training for commanders, 
and encouraging more male victims to report sexual assaults.”87 But, 
with Secretary Hagel’s departure from the DOD,88 the future of 
positive reform from the government is currently being debated as the 
Obama Administration works to appoint its fourth Defense Secretary. 
Nominee Ashton Carter successfully received approval from the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 89  during which he vowed to 
combat the sexual assault crisis within the military.90 In response to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Former Secretary Panetta has spoken about the larger issue of rape and sexual 
assault on multiple occasions. However, in this instance, he specifically cited the 
most recent case of Jeremy Goulet. Hayes Brown, Panetta: Military ‘Looked the 




86 Mary F. Calvert, Photos: Women Who Risked Everything to Expose Sexual 
Assault in the Military, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:15 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/sexual-violence-american-military-
photos. 
87 Id.  
88 Craig Whitlock & Missy Ryan, Defense Secretary Hagel, Under Pressure, 




89 Bill Chappell, Senate Panel Approves Carter’s Nomination as Defense Chief, 
NPR (Feb. 10, 2015, 10:09 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2015/02/10/385181377/senate-panel-approves-carter-s-nomination-as-defense-
chief. 
90 Lisa Lambert, Obama Defense Nominee Vows to Fight Sexual Assault in the 
Military, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2015, 3:26 PM), 	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questioning from Senator Gillibrand, Carter stated, “. . . the idea that 
victims are retaliated against, not only by the hierarchy above them 
but by their peers, is something that is unacceptable and is something 
that we need to combat.”91 
2. Congressional “Outcries” 
Congress also responded to the drastic increase, often 
characterized as an epidemic, of rape and sexual assault in the 
military.92 In November 2012, the United States Senate voted to 
require that any service member convicted of rape, sexual assault, or 
forcible sodomy who did not receive a sentence that ordered punitive 
dismissal be administratively discharged.93 Imposing this requirement 
would affirm the military’s commitment to punishing sexual assault 
without burdening the military courts because it would be a matter of 
administrative law rather than judicial review.94  
Other proposed additions to the congressional regulation of the 
U.S. Armed Forces include mandating that rape, sexual assault, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-usa-pentagon-carter-sexual-assault-
idUSKBN0L82F820150204. 
91 Id.  
92 See, e.g., Jackie Speier, Why Rapists in Military Get Away With It, CNN (June 
21, 2012, 8:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/21/opinion/speier-military-rape/ 
(“These disturbing statistics illustrate an ongoing epidemic of rape and sexual 
assault in the military that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta believes amounted to 
19,000 incidents in just 2010.”); THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17.  
93 Rick Maze, Senate Cracks Down on Sex Assaults in Military, AIR FORCE 
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/11/military-sex-assaults-senate-troops-
discharged-112812w/.  
94 Id. Such individuals would not be automatically discharged based on their 
conviction. The individual service member would receive due process before 
administrative discharge. The overall intent of the amendment is to decrease the 
amount of cases in which service members are punished with a fine or reduction in 
rank. Heidi Evans, Pols: Oust Sex Sickos in Military, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 3, 
2012, 11:17 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/pols-oust-sex-sickos-
military-article-1.1212821?localLinksEnabled=false. 
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forcible sodomy be considered through courts-martial only, limiting 
the disposition of these allegations to the purview of military courts. 
Another recommendation would lower the standard of proof for 
victims who attempt to gain any form of benefits from Veterans 
Affairs.95  
Congress proposed multiple pieces of legislation in an attempt 
to regulate the military’s treatment of these issues. In 2012, the United 
States House of Representatives introduced the Sexual Assault 
Training Oversight and Prevention Act (STOP Act).96 Among other 
provisions, the STOP Act is intended to integrate civilian personnel 
into oversight committees to provide greater transparency when 
adjudicating these claims.97 The 113th Congress failed to pass the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Maze, supra note 93. 
96 Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention Act, H.R. 3435, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
97 According to a summary of the STOP Act, the following are the principal 
goals of the Act: 
• Establish an autonomous office, the Sexual Assault Oversight and 
Response Office (SAPRO), that would be staffed by both military and 
civilian personnel in order to take the reporting process out of the chain of 
command. 
• Create a SAPRO Council within the DOD to advise SAPRO and to report 
to Congress; the Council will consist of two former military judges, a 
member of the Department of Justice (DOJ), a known advocate for sexual 
assault victims in the military and one expert working in civilian sexual 
assault cases. 
• Establish the Director of Military Prosecutions to oversee all sexual assault 
prosecutions and to decide whether to appeal cases within DOD or the 
Department of Justice. 
• Create a new method of reporting rather than having the report go through 
the Chain of Command (COC); this will also deter the use of non-judicial 
punishment against the alleged perpetrator and make sure the case is 
accurately and fully assessed by SAPRO. 
• Create a sexual assault database for the Military where the DOD can 
collect and maintain data regarding sexual assault in the military. 
Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention Act Summary, CONGRESSWOMAN 	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STOP Act; 98  the bill will have to be reintroduced in the 114th 
Congress to be further considered. 
Additionally, Senator Kristen Gillibrand proposed the Military 
Justice Improvement Act (MJIA).99 The MJIA focuses on decreasing 
the amount of discretion the chain of command has in deciding 
whether to investigate and prosecute claims.100 Under the MJIA, 
individuals in the chain of command would not have the discretion to 
set aside findings of guilt against an individual service member.101 
The MJIA also seeks to remove bias from proceedings at court-
martial by redefining who can initiate these proceedings. Most 
importantly, the MJIA would require that allegations received by an 
officer from a member of their chain of command be referred to the 
proper criminal investigatory authority immediately.102 The ultimate 
goal of these changes is to remove as much discretion from 
commanding officers as possible. In support of this, Senator Gilibrand 
noted “25% of women and 27% of men who received unwanted 
sexual contact indicated the offender was someone in their military 
chain of command.”103 
Senator Claire McCaskill proposed amendments to the U.S. 
personnel policy guidelines that did not dispense of commander 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
JACKIE SPEIER, http://www.speier.house.gov/images/stopactsummary.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Sexual Assault Training Oversight and 
Prevention Act Summary]; see also The STOP Act: Sexual Assault in the Military, 
BOS. AREA RAPE CRISIS CENTER, (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.barcc.org/blog/details/the-stop-act-sexual-assault-in-the-military  
98 See H.R. 1593 – STOP Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1593/actions (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2015).  
99 Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). 
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice Improvement Act, 
supra note 39.  
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discretion in the same way the MJIA proposed.104 Under Senator 
McCaskill’s proposal, the victim would decide whether to prosecute 
his or her case in a civilian or military jurisdiction.105 Additionally, 
victims can use confidential means to challenge any separation or 
discharge that results from reporting a sexual assault claim.106  
 In the end, the MJIA’s evisceration of commander discretion 
was its downfall. In March 2014, the MJIA failed to pass through the 
Senate.107 Senator Gillibrand’s reform lost by ten votes (55-45), even 
in light of the recent revelations. While many hope that this will only 
be a first step in Senator Gillibrand’s efforts, congressional resistance 
to such reform is strong.  
Senator Claire McCaskill’s competing reforms did pass in 
March of 2014.108 However, the effectiveness of Senator McCaskill’s 
proposals was recently called into question as statistics released from 
the DOD for the 2013 Fiscal Year show little progress in deterring 
rape and sexual assault.109 As of December 2014, Senator Gillibrand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See Better Enforcement for Sexual Assault Free Environments Act of 2013, S. 
1032, 113th Cong. (2013). Further, “McCaskill also included provisions in the 2012 
and 2013 National Defense Authorization Acts designed to improve the military's 
response to sexual assault and encourage the services to adopt training for sexual 
assault investigators developed at the Army's Military Police School at Fort Leonard 
Wood.” Claire McCaskill, McCaskill Calls for Action is Dismissed Sexual Assault 
Conviction, PULASKI COUNTY MIRROR (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.pulaskicountymirror.com/missouri_news/article_65eebb82-85e0-11e2-
9b53-001a4bcf6878.html; Press Release, United States Senator Claire McCaskill, 
McCaskill Drafts Legislation in Response to Air Force Sexual Assault Case (Mar. 
13, 2013), available at http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-center/news-
releases/mccaskill-drafts-legislation-in-response-to-air-force-sexual-assault-case. 
105 Darren Samuelsohn, Claire McCaskill’s Sexual Assault Bill Passes, POLITICO 
(March 10, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/claire-
mccaskill-military-sexual-assault-bill-104499.html. 
106 Id.  
107 Mascaro, supra note 18. 
108 See Samuelsohn, supra note 105. 
109 Press Release, Senator Kristein Gillibrand, Gillibrand Statement on New 
Disappointing Military Sexual Assault Data—Nearly Two-Thirds of Those Who 
Reported an Assault Say Faced Retaliation Despite Reforms Made Making 
Retaliation a Crime (Dec. 3, 2014), available at 	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reignited her campaign to aggressively reform military justice in light 
of new reports indicating an increase in rape and sexual assault 
released by the DOD for the 2013 fiscal year.110 
II. THE CURRENT RAMPAGE OF RAPE 
The growing number of allegations at Lackland AFB defines the 
new wave of the sexual assault epidemic. Because of the scale and 
gravity of this recent scandal, investigations are ongoing at other 
military bases. The Lackland AFB scandal prompted investigations 
into the conduct of high-ranking military officials. Investigations of 
such stature are a new and key characteristic of the current wave of 
the sexual assault epidemic. 
An effective review of the current problem of rape and sexual 
assault within the military is not limited to just these current scandals. 
Emerging consequences of the lack of deterrence of such conduct 
should also be assessed in order to fully understand the gravity of this 
epidemic.  
A. Beyond the Assault: Consequences & Current Calls for Action 
The current military statistics on rape and sexual assault and 
the lack of prosecution are alarming.111 The prevalence of Military 
Sexual Trauma (MST) is even more sobering. MST refers to the 
trauma experienced by victims of sexual assault or repeated 
threatening acts of sexual harassment.112 Sufferers of MST are more 





110 Id.  
111 See Samuelsohn supra note 105; see also supra text accompanying note 4. 
112 Military Sexual Trauma, U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFF. (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/mst_general_factsheet.pdf. 
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likely to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).113 In fact, 
victims of sexual assault are more likely to suffer from PTSD caused 
by MST compared to PTSD caused by experiences on the 
battlefield.114  
While victims of MST need both physical and psychological 
care, these victims are discouraged from seeking help from Veterans 
Affairs.115 Veterans Affairs has a well-documented history of denying 
benefits to individuals who suffer from MST.116 Many victims seeking 
help from Veterans Affairs have reported feeling as if they have 
undergone a “second victimization” by seeking out such help.117 
Rejection of claims often triggers a victim’s sense of hopelessness 
and betrayal.118 Such treatment often furthers the trauma sustained by 
the reporting victim and worsens potential depression and mental 
illness stemming from the incident of sexual assault, both of which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 PTSD is defined as a mental health condition triggered by a terrifying event. 
Those who suffer from PTSD generally experience difficulty adjusting and coping 
with the event. In some cases, PTSD can worsen over time, sometimes resulting a 
complete upheaval of a person’s life. See Mayo Clinic Staff, Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD), MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/post-traumatic-stress-disorder/DS00246; e.g., 
Wolf, supra note 2. 
114 See Wolf, supra note 2. 
115 Brittany L. Stalsburg, Military Sexual Trauma: The Facts, SERVICE 
WOMEN’S ACTION NETWORK, http://servicewomen.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/SWAN-MST-fact-sheet1.pdf. 
116 The Ruth Moore Act of 2013 seeks to address this issue. The goal presents 
two essential reforms: (1) to improve the claims process and (2) to lower the 
standards of evidence by “tying an applicant’s mental health state to an assault.” See 
Molly O’Toole, Ruth Moore Act of 2013, Military Sexual Assault Bill, Highlights 
Survivors’ Struggle for Benefits, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2013, 5:14 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/ruth-moore-act-of-2013-military-
sexual-assault_n_2674606.html. However, the Act only stands a 3% chance of 
passing through the House of Representatives Veterans’ Affairs Committee. Sepp, 
supra note 12. 
117 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 2. 
118 Stalsburg, supra note 115.  
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further the trauma and mental illness sustained by the reporting 
victim.119  
Calls for reform have emerged from differing political and 
legal organizations. Many called upon Congress to conduct further 
investigations. In July of 2012, Paula Coughlin-Puopolo, the most 
prominent victim of the Tailhook Scandal, unveiled a petition calling 
for the House Armed Services Committee to fully investigate the 
scandal at Lackland AFB.120  
The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing in 
March 2013, addressing rape and sexual assault.121 The Committee 
heard from victims and experts, including the Director of the Service 
Women’s Action Network (SWAN) and former Marine, Anu 
Bhagwati. Ms. Bhagwati called on Congress to grant “authority over 
criminal cases to trained, professional, disinterested prosecutors”122 
and for military victims to have access to civil courts.123  
Outside of Congress, the legal community is also mobilizing. 
Eight current and former female U.S. service members filed suit 
against the current and former Defense Secretaries, Navy Secretaries, 
and Marine commanders.124 These service members allege that the 
DOD allowed for the development of a military culture that fails to 
adequately prevent or address rape and sexual assault.125 Plaintiffs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Id. 
120 Sign Paula’s Petition: Demand Congress Investigates Sexual Assaults at 
Lackland Air Force Base, PROTECT THE DEFENDERS, 
http://action.protectourdefenders.com/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=8040 (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2015).  
121 Testimony on Sexual Assault in the Military Before the Subcomm. on 
Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 113th Cong. (2013). 
122 Levs & Frantz, supra note 2. 
123 Id.  
124 Stacey Samuel, Female Service Members Sue U.S. Military for Alleged Rape, 
Sexual Assault, CNN (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-
06/us/us_military-sex-assaults-lawsuit_1_sexual-assault-service-members-marine-
corps?_s=PM:US; see Klay et al v. Panetta et al, AAUW, 
http://www.aauw.org/resource/klay-et-al-v-panetta-et-al/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
125 Ashley Parker, Lawsuit Says Military is Rife with Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/us/16military.html. 
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assert that the DOD’s failure to act against this culture is a violation 
of the their constitutional rights because Congress provided the 
military with a clear mandate pertaining to the regulation and 
maintenance of rape and sexual assault cases.126 
Similarly, nineteen other service members, veterans and 
active-duty alike, filed a suit against Panetta and other former Defense 
Secretaries, claiming they suffered civil rights violations stemming 
from institutional disregard of their claims of rape and sexual 
assault. 127  These plaintiffs allege that the civil rights violations 
occurred as a result of the Secretaries’ inability to protect service 
members from sexual assault.128 Plaintiffs further allege that the DOD 
“presided over dysfunctional systems,” where only “a tiny fraction of 
sexual assault charges are investigated.”129 Making matters worse, 
plaintiffs allege that in light of these issues, the DOD “repeatedly 
refused to do anything to fix the problem.”130  
The suit brought by attorney Susan L. Burke131 alleges that 
former Secretaries of Defense (Panetta, Gates, and Rumsfeld) knew 
the military was violating the constitutional rights of men and women 
who sought to report rape and sexual assault.132 Plaintiffs allege that 
the former Secretaries presided over a dysfunctional system in which 
a small percentage of reports were actually investigated.133 Plaintiffs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Id.; Jesse Ellison, Panetta, Gates, Rumsfeld Face New Suit Over U.S. Military 
Rape ‘Epidemic,’ DAILY BEAST (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/06/panetta-gates-rumsfeld-face-new-
suit-over-u-s-military-rape-epidemic.html.  
127 Ellison, supra note 23. 
128 Id. 
 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Susan Burke is currently the leading litigator on the issue of rape and sexual 
assault within the military. She is spearheading a series of lawsuits designed to 
“reform the manner in which the military prosecutes rape and sexual assault.” Susan 
L. Burke, BURKE PLLC, http://burkepllc.com/attorneys/susan-l-burke/ (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2014). 
132 Ellison, supra note 126.  
133 Id. 
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further allege that because military leaders failed to enact more 
preventive measures, they refused to fix the problem; by refusing to 
actively and effectively address the prevalence of sexual harassment 
and assault in the military, the American military leadership violated 
the constitutional rights of sexual assault victims.134 
B. The New Gender Panic: Prompting New Resolutions for Reform 
The prevalence of sexual assault in the military is commonly 
referred to as “the new gender panic.” 135  This panic prompted 
literature—authored by both service members and civilian 
academics—assesses the prevalence of rape and sexual assault within 
the military. Such literature has proposed various legislative and 
systemic reforms aimed at deterring such conduct. This Part will 
review some of these proposed resolutions. A review of these 
resolutions is important to establish an understanding of the differing 
institutional facets comprising the regulation of service members. 
However, a critical assessment of each proposal demonstrates their 
overall inefficacy. In order to provide justice to victims of sexual 
assault and rape, a new, dramatic resolution is necessary. 
1. Consent Standards and Methods of Reporting Consent Standards 
A variety of proposed reform measures attempt to responds to 
the inadequacies of current preventative measures. Such reforms 
include calls for the UCMJ to adopt an affirmative consent standard 
wherein affirmative consent of all participating parties would be 
required before penetration occurs.136 Proponents contend that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Id.  
135 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 45, at 316.  
136 “‘Women must directly and explicitly express their sexual desire or 
agreement to have intercourse in a given situation, and men must respond 
accordingly. Instead of assuming a woman’s sexual ambivalence indicates consent, 
the law should assume that sexual ambivalence means no.’” Knies, supra note 65, at 	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provides a clear standard that would prevent miscommunication while 
maintaining good order and discipline within the military.137 This 
bright line rule is consistent with consent standards in other areas of 
the law. 138  Supporters contend that this resolution presents a 
promising means “to establish a culture of respect and responsible 
sexual interaction among members of the armed forces.”139  
 However, the unique features of the command-subordinate 
relationship between recruits and commanding officers140 renders an 
affirmative consent standard inadequate. Further, military leaders 
generally deny the existence of rape and sexual assault within the 
ranks.141 An affirmative consent standard would be ineffective in 
practice because of the military leadership’s willing ignorance with 
respect reports brought to their attention.  
a. Methods of Reporting 
The power relationship of commanding officers and recruits 
speaks directly to the lack of transparency regarding over these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 (quoting Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the 
Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 485 (2005)). 
137 Id. at 3; see In re M.T.S, 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (“Permission is 
demonstrated when the evidence, in whatever form, is sufficient to demonstrate that 
a reasonable person would have believed that the alleged victim had affirmatively 
and freely given authorization to the act.”).  The California Senate recently passed 
an affirmative consent law to address the crisis of sexual assault in higher education. 
The Bill, known as the “Yes Means Yes” Bill, places the consent burden on both 
parties to affirmatively consent to sexual intercourse instead of one party waiting for 
another to indicate they do not want to engage in intercourse. The Bill, which has 
received criticism throughout the state, also requires consent to be ongoing 
throughout sexual intercourse. Eyder Peralta, California Lawmakers Pass 
‘Affirmative Consent’ Sexual Assault Bill, NPR (Aug. 29, 2014, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/08/29/344230662/california-passes-
affirmative-consent-sexual-assault-bill.   
138 Knies, supra note 65, at 9. 
139 Id. at 33. 
140 See Pickands, supra note 8, at 2425.  
141 Cornett, supra note 22, at 105. 
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claims.142 In the current system of reporting, the unit commander 
receives the initial report from the victim.143 The unit commander then 
decides whether the case is given to investigating authorities.144 This 
step is determinative of whether the case is prosecuted.145 If the 
commander chooses not to give the case to the investigating 
authorities the allegation stops with the initial report.146  
This ambiguity in the process of reporting and prosecuting a 
claim served as the genesis to the STOP Act, the overarching goal of 
which is to include a greater amount of transparency in the reporting 
process.147 However, it is too soon to determine the effectiveness of 
the STOP Act in remedying this issue.  
2. Removing Commander Discretion 
Some argue that the military’s male-dominated population 
creates a pervasive paternalistic culture.148 This paternalistic culture 
manifests as a bias against victims that report incidences of sexual 
assault. Proponents of this theory suggest that by providing 
commanders with objective rules and procedures, discretion is 
removed from the equation, thereby minimizing commander bias.149 
Additionally, removing this discretion would create uniformity 
throughout the process of reporting, furthering the ultimate goal of 
“increas[ing] victim confidence in reporting procedures.”150  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Molly O’Toole, Military Sexual Assault Epidemic Continues to Claim 





145 Id.  
146 Id. 
147 See Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention Act Summary, supra 
note 97. 
148 See, e.g., Cornett, supra note 22, at 110, 112. 
149 Id. at 110. 
150 Id.  
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This line of thinking is particularly salient amongst 
congressional proponents for reform. For example, in March 2013, 
during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Personnel, Anu Bhagwati of SWAN pointed out, 
“Commanding officers cannot make truly impartial decisions because 
of their professional affiliation with the accused, and oftentimes with 
the victim as well.”151  
However, objective rules and procedures do not sweep broadly 
enough to encompass the entirety of the problem; rules and 
procedures ignore the reality of the military leadership’s willful 
ignorance. First, in addressing the breadth of such a reform, the issue 
of commander discretion requires not only the elimination of bias 
through the implementation of transparent methods of reporting, but 
also the elimination of its residual effects. Second, implementing 
objective standards for military leadership does not adequately 
address the lack of transparency. The significant lack of transparency 
currently present in the reporting infrastructure, evidenced by SAPRO 
reports, greatly contributes to the issue of bias stemming from 
commander discretion.152 While the SAPRO reports demonstrate that 
there is a problem pertaining to rape and sexual assault, these reports 
are largely incomplete. For example, many of these reports lack 
information regarding the types of incidents reported.153  
Asking commanders to follow a list of objective standards, and 
failing to change incomplete reporting processes, unsuccessfully 
address the lack of transparency. Sexual assault victims and the rest of 
society cannot trust commanders to implement reform in their own 
command practice while these same commanders willfully ignore the 
sexual assault epidemic.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Levs & Frantz, supra note 2. 
152 Cornett, supra note 22, at 112. 
153 For example, in 2005, sexual assault data collected indicated that 43% of the 
investigations were classified as “unsubstantiated claims, insufficient evidence, 
victim recantation or death of the alleged offender.” Id.  
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3. Reforming the UCMJ 
A wealth of literature exists on reforming the definitions of rape 
and sexual assault within the UMCJ. Suggested reforms range from 
adopting judicial interpretations and innovations of existing legal 
concepts, such as constructive force, to adopting affirmative consent 
standards within the language of Article 120 itself.  
While courts typically read constructive force into the definition 
of force in Article 120, some contend that this reading is a form of 
judicial activism that has no relevance to the elements of forcible 
rape.154 One author contends that this should be an indication for 
Congress to revisit the definition of rape.155 The assertion is that until 
Congress acts, military law must recognize that nonviolent, coercive 
sexual imposition is not rape, and therefore, military law must 
criminalize constructive force as a separate offense.156 As discussed 
previously, some have also called for the inclusion of an affirmative 
consent standard within the language of Article 120 in order to 
provide a bright-line standard for military courts and service members 
to follow.157  
These proposals rely on the assumption that unrestricted reports 
made by victims actually go to court. However, too many alleged 
assaults fail to make it past the initial reporting phase because of 
detrimental commander discretion.158 Furthermore, many victims do 
not report incidences of sexual assault for fear of retaliation.159 
SAPRO reported that in one year, of the estimated 19,000 incidences 
of assault, only 3,192 cases of sexual assault were actually reported.160 
Out of the cases that were reported, 1,518 of these reports were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Pickands, supra note 8, at 2427.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 2427, 2454. 
157 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing consent standards and methods of reporting). 
158 See O’Toole, supra note 142. 
159 Cornett, supra note 22, at 109-10.  
160 O’Toole, supra note 142. 
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referred for possible disciplinary action.161  Ultimately, only 191 
service members were convicted of such crimes at courts-martial.162  
UCMJ reform will not be effective if the military cannot 
successfully encourage victims to make initial reports of rape and 
sexual assault. Unless a victim can make an initial report that is 
openly received and subject to minimal bias, it is difficult and 
illogical to focus on the adjudicative process.  
III. GIVING VOICE TO SILENCED CLAIMS 
 Proposed resolutions generally consider complex gender 
problems and some have gone as far as to call for more civilian 
oversight, as is apparent in the STOP Act and in changes made to U.S. 
personnel policy in FY2013. Yet, these resolutions fail to address the 
central issue that perpetuates the epidemic of rape and sexual assault 
by making the assumption that the adjudication system, and not the 
reporting system, is the epicenter of the problem.  
A. Hurdles to adjudication: Unit and Administrative Bias 
Institutional bias against rape and sexual assault victims runs 
throughout the military reporting and investigation processes.163 As 
discussed previously, in most cases, victims of rape and sexual assault 
are pressured to not report assault incidents.164  
1. Unit Retaliation 
The possibility of retaliation is a reality all rape and sexual 
assault victims must face. Most victims within the military who report 
their claims face retaliation in the form of a dishonorable discharge. 
For example, a petty officer of the Navy who was raped received 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Wolf, supra note 2. 
162 Id. 
163 See, e.g., O’Toole, supra note 142. 
164 THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17. 
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dishonorable discharge forms shortly after deciding to terminate the 
resultant pregnancy per the recommendation of her unit leadership.165 
Many women discharged after being deemed “psychologically unfit” 
were raped or sexually assaulted during their service.166 Many of these 
victims were denied much-needed benefits by Veterans’ Affairs 
because of their dishonorable discharge status.167 
2. Administrative Bias 
Administrative bias is evident both in the disregard the 
military leadership shows toward reports of rape and sexual assault in 
the military and in the inefficacy of discharge review boards. All 
branches of the military maintain discharge review boards.168 These 
boards are granted the authority to correct, modify, or change a 
discharge or dismissal from the military.169 Victims who are wrongly 
discharged for reporting their claim who then choose to petition for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Kelly Gustafson, Measure Aims to Help Raped Servicewomen, UNITED PRESS 
INT’L (Nov. 9, 2012, 8:18 AM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/11/09/Measure-aims-to-help-raped-
servicewomen/UPI-44161352467088/. 
166 David S. Martin, Rape Victims Say Military Labels Them ‘Crazy,’ CNN (Apr. 
14, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/14/health/military-sexual-
assaults-personality-disorder/. 
167 Some of these victims were discharged just months before they could have 
left the service with benefits. See, e.g., THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17; O’Toole, 
supra note 116.  
168 See, e.g., ARMY REV. BOARDS AGENCY, http://arba.army.pentagon.mil (last 
visited July 28, 2014); Air Force Review Boards Agency, U.S. AIR FORCE, 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104511/air-force-
review-boards-agency.aspx (last visited July 28, 2014); SECRETARY OF THE NAVY’S 
COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/asnmra/corb/PEB/Pages/SECNAV%20CORB%20Hom
e.aspx (last visited July 28, 2014); Board for Correction of Military Records, U.S. 
COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/Legal/BCMR.asp (last visited July 28, 2014). 
169 Discharge Review Boards, MILITARY.COM, 
http://www.military.com/benefits/records-and-forms/discharge-review.html (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2012); Applying for a Discharge Upgrade, REAL WARRIORS (Nov. 
16, 2014), http://www.realwarriors.net/veterans/discharge/upgrade.php.  
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review of their discharge or termination of benefits face an uphill 
battle. These victims are unlikely to even receive a review much less a 
favorable ruling. 170  Furthermore, boards generally affirm the 
discharge of these types of victims.171 
Veterans who have or have had disabilities that intensified 
during active military duty may qualify for medical or related benefits, 
regardless of their discharge characterization.172 While the VA asserts 
that MST victims have the right to access healthcare like any other 
veteran, the hurdles to accessing such care in MST cases are 
exceedingly more difficult.173 Many legislators and veterans groups 
argue that the standards are stacked against victims in these 
proceedings.174 Currently, MST victims are required to show proof of 
the sexual assault or harassment alleged, that the assault or 
harassment lead to a diagnosis of a recognized health problem such as 
PTSD, and that the disability benefit request is related to sexual 
trauma.175 Further, many review boards elect to treat cases of rape and 
sexual assault independent of a victim’s service. That is, the effects of 
rape and sexual assault are not considered aggravated disabilities 
incurred during a victim’s time in the armed forces, even if the assault 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Demonstrative of this is the case of Kori Cioca who was discharged just 
months before she would have honorably left the Coast Guard with full benefits. 
She continues to fight administrative review boards and Veterans Affairs for 
coverage of a surgery to fix disks in her lower jaw. This damage resulted from being 
forcibly raped while serving her county. Her attacker punched her across the face, 
breaking her jaw, causing permanent damage to the disks in the back of her jaw. 
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17. 
171 Id.  
172 Discharge characterization is determined on a case-by-case basis. See 
Discharge Review Boards, supra note 169. 
173  Kevin Freking, Military Sexual Assault Victims Seek Help From Veterans 
Affairs, AP (May 20, 2013, 9:49 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/20/military-sexual-
assault_n_3306295.html. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. Critics of this standard argue that victims filing for benefits should be 
allowed to make their case on the assertion of rape alone, followed by an 
assessment of their health condition conducted by a VA examiner. 
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or rape occurred while the victim was serving. Thus, many rape and 
sexual assault victims that receive honorable discharges after being 
found to be psychologically unfit for service are barred from 
receiving any benefits or treatment from the Veterans Affairs (VA).176  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Types of discharge from the U.S. Armed forces include:  
 
Honorable Discharge 
If a military service member received a good or excellent rating 
for their service time, by exceeding standards for performance and 
personal conduct, they will be discharged from the military 
honorably. An honorable military discharge is a form of 
administrative discharge. 
General Discharge 
If a service member’s performance is satisfactory but the 
individual failed to meet all expectations of conduct for military 
members, the discharge is considered a general discharge. To 
receive a general discharge from the military there has to be some 
form of nonjudicial punishment to correct unacceptable military 
behavior. A general military discharge is a form of administrative 
discharge. 
Other Than Honorable Conditions Discharge 
The most severe type of military administrative discharge is the 
Other Than Honorable Conditions. Some examples of actions that 
could lead to an Other Than Honorable Discharge include security 
violations, use of violence, conviction by a civilian court with a 
sentence including prison time, or being found guilty of adultery 
in a divorce hearing (this list is not a definitive list; these are only 
examples). In most cases, veterans who receive an Other Than 
Honorable Discharge cannot re-enlist in the Armed Forces or 
reserves, except under very rare circumstances. Veteran’s benefits 
are not usually available to those discharged through this type of 
discharge…. 
Dishonorable Discharge 
If the military considers a service members actions to be 
reprehensible, the general court-martial can determine a 
dishonorable discharge is in order. Murder and sexual assault are 
examples of situations which would result in a dishonorable 
discharge. If someone is dishonorably discharged from the 
military they are not allowed to own firearms according to US 
federal law. Military members who receive a Dishonorable 	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In order to appeal the decision of military review board in a 
civilian forum, a claimant must file suit under the Tucker Act177 and 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 178  Under the APA, 
claimants must persuade a court to “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions” because they are, 
 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, 
or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right; (D) without observance of 
procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by 
substantial evidence…or (F) unwarranted by the 
facts….179  
 
This highly deferential standard in favor of the agency or 
governmental action limits a claimant’s chance of success. 180 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Discharge forfeit all military and veterans benefits and may have 
a difficult time finding work in the civilian sector. 
 
Ryan Guina, Types of Military Discharge, MIL. WALLET (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://themilitarywallet.com/types-of-military-discharges/. 
177 The Tucker Act exposes the government to liability for certain claims, 
because the U.S. waived its sovereign immunity with respect to these claims. The 
Tucker Act authorizes claims against the U.S. under the following three 
circumstances: (1) contractual claims, (2) non- contractual claims in which the 
plaintiff seeks to be refunded money paid to the government and (3) non-contractual 
claims in which the plaintiff asserts that they are entitled to payment by the U.S. 
government. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2011).  
178 Applying to both federal executive departments and to independent agencies, 
the APA establishes procedures and regulations to allow for review of agency 
decisions by the federal courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
179 Id at § 706(2).  
180 See River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 
2009) (“Accordingly, our review under section 706(2)(A) is highly deferential, and 
the agency’s actions are presumed to be valid.”).  
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Additionally, civilian courts are generally reluctant to review and 
change the decisions of military leadership and military courts.181  
B. Necessary Steps: Protection for Victims who Report 
For many victims, actions responding to the problems of bias 
and retaliation are often too late to remedy the harm.182 An effective 
resolution must secure protection for reporting victims before bias 
manifests and retaliation occurs.  
An effective resolution to the problem of retaliation could be 
derived from the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA).183 
A rape and sexual assault whistleblower protection statute that looks 
to 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (“Protected communications; prohibition of 
retaliatory personnel actions”) could be an effective solution, as it 
would give the same protections to victims of sexual assault as 
whistleblowers.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 The deferential posture of the judiciary with respect to the military is 
entrenched within this country’s legal history. Deference justified the position of the 
court in several Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950) (holding that deference must be afforded to the military tribunals in 
deciding the guilt of German war criminals whose due process rights had been 
suspended); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (refusing to reject 
military judgment as being unfounded and further allotting deference to the “war-
making branches of the Government”); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862) (holding 
that even without express constitutional authorization, in times of war, the president 
must confront and meet an eminent threat and should not wait for congressional or 
constitutional sanction). While these cases specifically dealt with the wartime power 
of the executive branch, language from these opinions accurately reflects the 
judiciary’s deferential posture.  
182 Many of the cases highlighted in The Invisible War are demonstrative of how 
quickly personnel action can be taken against a reporting individual, undermining 
most methods of redress currently available. See THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17. 
183 See 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2012). 




10 U.S.C. § 1034: A Legislative Model 
 
Protection against rape, sexual assault, and retaliation does not 
exist within the military.184 Further, there is no specific provision 
within the UCMJ’s sexual misconduct articles that provides for the 
protection of victims who choose to report their assaults.185  
The MWPA could be used as a model for reform. The MWPA 
protects communications among service members, members of 
Congress, and Investigating Generals of the DOD. 186  Under the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (holding that the 
United States is not liable for injuries sustained to service members, through the 
negligence of another, while on duty within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act).  
185 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012); id. at § 925; id at § 927. 
186 Id. § 1034: 
 
(a) Restricting communications with Members of 
Congress and Inspector General prohibited.—(1) No 
person may restrict a member of the armed forces in 
communicating with a Member of Congress or an 
Inspector General. 
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a communication that 
is unlawful. 
(b) Prohibition of retaliatory personnel actions.—(1) No 
person may take (or threaten to take) an unfavorable 
personnel action, or withhold (or threaten to withhold) a 
favorable personnel action, as a reprisal against a 
member of the armed forces for making or preparing— 
(A) a communication to a Member of Congress 
or an Inspector General that (under subsection 
(a)) may not be restricted; or 
(B) a communication that is described in 
subsection (c)(2) and that is made (or prepared 
to be made) to— 
(i) a Member of Congress; 
(ii) an Inspector General (as defined in 
subsection (i)) or any other Inspector 	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MWPA, communications between service members and members of 
Congress shall not be deterred in any way.187 No adverse personnel 
action may be taken against the individual in response to these 
protected communications.188  
General criticisms of whistleblower protection in the military, 
before and after the enactment of the MWPA, direct public attention 
to the integrity of whistleblowing protection in this sphere of military-
Congress communication.189 The call for reform of whistleblower 
protections, in conjunction with the increased focus on the current 
epidemic of rape and sexual assault, creates a hospitable environment 
for analogous protection for reporting victims. Protections similar to 
those outlined in the MWPA should be afforded to victims of rape 
and sexual assault if the American military hopes to increase the 
number of victims who report assault.  
As discussed supra, while restricted reports can be viewed as the 
resolution to retaliatory action, victims must forfeit all hope of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
General appointed under the Inspector 
General Act of 1978; 
(iii) a member of a Department of 
Defense audit, inspection, investigation, 
or law enforcement organization; 
(iv) any person or organization in the 
chain of command; or 
(v) any other person or organization 
designated pursuant to regulations or 
other established administrative 
procedures for such communications. 
(2) Any action prohibited by paragraph (1) (including the 
threat to take any unfavorable action and the withholding 
or threat to withhold any favorable action) shall be 
considered for the purposes of this section to be a 
personnel action prohibited by this subsection. 
Id. 
187 See id.  
188 See id. 
189 See, e.g., Nick Schwellenbach, Why Military Whistleblowers Fear Reprisal, 
TIME (Oct. 20, 2011), http://nation.time.com/2011/10/20/why-military-
whistleblowers-fear-reprisal/. 
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prosecutorial justice in order to insulate themselves from retaliation. 
Use of restricted reports forces victims to choose between personal 
dignity and professional survival. Restricted reports, by themselves, 
are not a sufficient resolution. Restricted reporting, coupled with 
whistleblower protection, is a more effective approach.  
C. Modeling after 10 U.S.C. §1034: Subordination and Retaliation 
 The current military culture needs to be reformed.190 Providing 
more protection for reporting victims would undercut the systemic 
underpinnings of misogyny in the military. 
 An effective statute must include protection against efforts to 
subordinate and retaliate against reporting victims. Thus, the 
following proposed model statute first focuses on subordination of 
individuals through the use of sexual violence. This portion of the 
model statute reflects the military courts’ willingness to sanction 
constructive force as sufficient evidence of force in rape and sexual 
assault cases. In addition, evidence must show that sexual misconduct 
and violence has been used for the purpose of subordinating another 
service member. This can be proven with circumstantial evidence. 
Second, the model statute defines the necessary elements of 
retaliation in order for a victim to seek protection.191 In seeking 
protection from further personnel action, an individual must show one 
or both of following: (1) sexual misconduct and/or violence was used 
for the purpose of subordinating the victim; and (2) personnel action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Chamallas, supra note 45, at 305 (“The military is regarded as one of the last 
bastions of male culture. . . . .”). 
191 This Note will not address remedies beyond injunctive relief that may be 
available to an individual who successfully alleges one or both of the elements of 
this model statute. While it is certainly possible that the statute could be 
incorporated into a larger criminal regulatory scheme or into a larger punishment 
scheme for the maintenance of good order within the Armed Forces, this Note 
specifically focuses on preventing these actions. The goal of this proposed statute is 
to foster an environment in which individuals are freer to make reports of rape and 
sexual assault.  
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has been taken against the reporting individual, sufficient to make a 
prima facie case for retaliation. 
 
IV. ALARM: ADVANCING THE LACKLAND ANTI-SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
RIGHTS MODEL 
The following is a suggested model statute, entitled “Advancing 
the Lackland Anti-Sexual Violence Rights Model” (ALARM). This 
statute closely reflects the structure of the MWPA and introduces new 
substantive protections for reporting individuals. 
 
“Advancing the Lackland Anti-Sexual Violence Rights Model” 
(ALARM) 
 
(a) Individual Subordination. No service member, officer or 
enlisted, may, against another service member, officer or 
enlisted: 
(1) Threaten the use of or actually use sexual 
misconduct, including, but not limited to: 
(A) Unwanted Sexual Attention, such as 
unwanted sexual touching or fondling,  
(B) Sexual Coercion, such as instances of quid 
pro quo agreements in which any subsequent 
employment action, beneficial or detrimental, is 
conditioned on sexual cooperation, 
(C) Sexual Assault, as defined by UCMJ 
Article 128, 
(D) Rape, as defined by UCMJ Article 120; 
(2) Through the use of actual or constructive force; 
(2) Without the express consent of the other service 
member; 
(3) With explicit or implicit intent; 
(4) In an attempt to relegate the other service member 
to a subordinate position, actual or constructive, to the 
aggressor; 
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(A) Relegating another service member to a 
subordinate position to that of the aggressor can 
be achieved with the express intent of the 
aggressor or impliedly through the use of 
emotional, physical, or psychological force in 
the course of threatening or using sexual 
misconduct against the other service 
member.192 
(b) Retaliation. No person may take, or threaten to take, an 
unfavorable personnel action or withhold, or threaten to 
withhold, a favorable personnel action, as reprisal against a 
member of the armed forces for: 
(1) Reporting an instance of sexual misconduct, sexual 
coercion, sexual assault, or rape to the proper authority 
in a given jurisdiction; or 
(2) Attempting to press charges against an individual 
or individuals for sexual misconduct, sexual coercion, 
sexual assault, or rape in both civilian and military 
jurisdictions; or  
(3) Pressing charges against an individual or 
individuals for sexual misconduct, sexual coercion, 
sexual assault, or rape in both civilian and military 
jurisdictions. 
(c) Duty to Assist. If a member of the armed forces reports to 
an intervening authority,193 such as a criminal investigation 
unit or a superior officer of a different unit, that personnel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 “The elements required for rape may be absent, yet the pressures exerted can 
be equally destructive of human dignity and personal autonomy.” Pickands, supra 
note 8, at 2426.  
193 Within the text of the statute, some examples are given as to what is meant by 
intervening authority. An intervening authority is intended to include any individual 
of superior rank, within or outside of the unit of the alleging victim, who learns of 
the sexual subordination of a service member or of the use of retaliation against that 
individual. “Intervening authority” is left intentionally broad as to not preclude 
individuals, (individuals of a higher rank, for example) from seeking help from an 
intervening authority.  
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action prohibited by Subsections (b)(1)-(3) has been 
threatened or taken against the reporting individual, the 
intervening authority or officer shall take all appropriate 
action; 
(1) Appropriate action includes, but is not limited to, 
aiding the service member in reporting the violation to 
the office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the 
respective branch of the military; 
(1) Upon a sufficient showing of circumstantial 
evidence of retaliation, the JAG shall request for a 
military protective order or a condition on liberty, 
prohibiting the use of official action against the 
individual reporting the claim of retaliation. 
(d) Military Protective Orders (MPOs).194 Upon a showing 
of circumstantial evidence of retaliation, the court hearing the 
petition may enforce one of the following remedies in order to 
protect the reporting individual from any harmful official 
action and to prevent any disclosure of the pending case to 
nonparties195: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Unit commanders can issue military protective orders (MPOs) to active duty 
service members to protect a domestic abuse victim. Military Protective Orders, 
WOMENSLAW.ORG (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.womenslaw.org/laws_state_type.php?id=10866&state_code=US. The 
victim must be a spouse, former spouse, current or former intimate partner, or have 
a child with the abuser. Id. In just 2004 the DOD established MPO-use for the 
protection of victims of domestic violence and child abuse. Memorandum from 
David S.C. Chu, Dep’t of Def. to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Military 
Protective OrderS (MPOs) (Mar. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/MilitaryProtectiveOrders.pdf. Extending the use of 
MPOs to victims of rape, sexual assault and further, professional subordination and 
retaliation seems highly reasonable.  
195 The intent of excluding nonparties from coming into contact with a potential 
claim is to protect an individual who may seek aid from another unit. Additionally, 
it also is intended to protect the reporting individual who may seek to transfer units 
from further harassment and retaliation.  
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(1) Short-term Order: Upon a finding of need, the court 
may order a short-term military protective order for a 
period of thirty days; or  
(2) Long-Term Order: Upon a finding of need, the 
court may order a long-term protective order for a 
period of sixty days; or 
(3) The court may also order a protective order for a 
different period of time, not to exceed one year, for the 
protection of the reporting individual; 
(4) Protective orders may be renewed as is afforded for 
by military law and procedure.  
 
Litigating the Lackland Rights Model: An Analysis of 
ALARM 
 
 ALARM defers to military courts in making findings of 
retaliation and subordination. This deference serves two purposes. 
First, the concept of subordination is a subjective term and often 
dependent upon the specific circumstances of an individual claim. 
Second, providing a specific factual definition of the terms 
subordination and retaliation would run the risk of preemptively 
negating claims for many victims. Such claims may be sufficient for 
one judge, but may not comport with an enumerated definition of 
subordination and/or retaliation.  
 The inclusion of the subordination claim, which encompasses 
the idea of relegating a service member to a position inferior to the 
aggressor, reflects the notion that sexual violence creates an 
environment ripe for retaliation. Once an aggressor has used 
emotional, physical, or psychological warfare against the victim, that 
aggressor is more likely to succeed in deterring his victim or victims 
from reporting the rape or sexual assault. Individuals continue to be 
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deterred from filing reports or seeing those reports through to criminal 
investigation because of the use of coercion.196  
 ALARM also prohibits the use of retaliation against the 
reporting individual.197 The language and structure of the retaliation 
claim is closely modeled after the MWPA, providing protection to 
individuals who do report. However, ALARM takes whistleblowing a 
step further with the imposition of a duty to report upon intervening 
authorities. Such a duty is necessary in order to ensure compliance 
with the statute. 
 Imposing this duty on intervening authorities distinguishes this 
model legislation from the failed effort of the MJIA and from the 
perceived weaknesses of Senator McCaskill’s approach. First, 
imposing the duty to report on intervening authorities does not 
remove commander authority entirely. It simply imposes a duty upon 
individuals receiving information to report that information to 
appropriate authorities, such as JAG or the commanding authority in 
question.  
This is in contrast to Senator McCaskill’s approach, which does 
not mandate reporting at all; any reporting is discretionary.198 Senator 
McCaskill stresses that under her approach, individual victims may 
choose to report incidences of sexual assault or rape to either the 
chain of command or to a JAG officer. Her proposal, while 
theoretically sound, fails to account for the reality that many victims 
face. Senator McCaskill’s approach ignores the real likelihood that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Other cases include individuals who have testified that the threat or use of 
sexual violence, which had a lasting emotional, physical, and psychological impact 
(including MST and PTSD), made them feel powerless and subordinate to their 
attacker. This powerlessness has deterred individual victims from reporting their 
claim. See THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17. “The elements required for rape may 
be absent, yet the pressures exerted can be equally destructive of human dignity and 
personal autonomy.” Pickands, supra note 8, at 2426.  
197 Another means of removing bias against rape and sexual assault victims also 
exists at the trial level in encouraging the use of implied bias challenges to jury 
members and court under Rules for Court Martial 912(f)(1)(N). The full extent of 
this argument is beyond the scope of this Note.  
198 See Mascaro, supra note 18. 
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the choice may not be available in practice. When an individual is 
raped or assaulted by a person in their chain of command, the choice 
to go outside of that avenue to report is unlikely, given the well-
documented problem with coercion and retaliation. By imposing a 
duty to report on intervening authorities, a victim’s relative position 
of power is strengthened because a response to an allegation, formally 
or informally made, is mandatory.  
 Requiring intervening authorities to report allegations of rape 
and sexual assault assures that military leadership may not take a 
position of willful ignorance. If an intervening authority fails to report, 
his failure to report will come to light in the course of the reporting 
process. If one superior officer fails to report allegations of rape or 
sexual assault to the appropriate authority (such as a criminal 
investigation unit, a commanding officer, or a JAG officer), another 
will. The duty to report these claims avails military leadership of 
liability for not taking action.199 The duty to report introduces a much-
needed element of compulsion that the current reporting system lacks.  
 The most innovative and crucial feature of ALARM is the use 
of military protective orders (MPOs) to protect reporting individuals. 
Through the process of obtaining an MPO, victims have the 
opportunity to prove their cases by using circumstantial evidence 
before harmful personnel action is taken against them.  
Harmful personnel action includes harassment, threats, 
professional punishment, violent action, and professional discharge.200 
This list is not exhaustive. Almost all victims who wish to report an 
attack are under the authority of a commanding officer. This 
commanding officer may ignore the allegations or even take 
retaliatory action against the victim.201 In such situations, the victim is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 This Note will not explore the forms of liability that an officer would be 
exposed to for failing to comply with this statute as it is beyond the central focus of 
the argument.  
200 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 2. 
201 A plethora of cases emerging at Lackland AFB, the conduct of Brigadier 
General Jeffery Sinclair, and the conduct of many of the alleged attackers 
demonstrate this point. See THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 17. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2015	  	  
	   279	  
often powerless because she may be subject to harmful personnel 
action. Such conduct, more often than not, has the desired effect; 
victims are forced into positions of submission.  
Under ALARM, the victim can request an MPO to prevent 
commanding authorities from retaliating against them. As discussed 
supra, harmful personnel action can ultimately mean the end of an 
individual’s career in the military and could prevent victims from 
accessing much-needed veteran benefits in the future. Courts may 
issue a short-term or long-term protective order; a MPO can remain in 
effect for up to one year. The one-year limitation recognizes that 
individuals cannot seek indefinite protection from commanding 
authorities, which could undercut the structure of unit cohesion and 
command. However, the ALARM MPO provision contains an 
elasticity clause that allows the tribunal to extend an MPO beyond a 
year in specific, compelling situations.  
The substantive provisions of ALARM are unprecedented 
within the regulatory scheme of the military. ALARM stretches 
beyond the conservative resolutions proposed to address rape and 
sexual assault in the U.S. Armed Forces. Victims of rape and sexual 
assault in the military have been overlooked, suppressed, and muted 
for far too long. ALARM sounds the alarm and gives voice to victims 
where military policy silences victims of rape and sexual assault. 
CONCLUSION: SOUNDING THE ALARM 
By reforming the reporting infrastructure, the military can deter 
the widespread problem of rape and sexual assault spanning over a 
period of thirty years. Meaningful and effective resolutions, such as 
ALARM, better protect and support victims who report their claims 
compared to conventional remedies. In presenting an innovative 
resolution to undercut the problems of bias, subordination, and lack of 
transparency, effective reform can provide a voice to coerced victims 
of rape and sexual assault. A voice can finally be given to the silenced 
lambs.  
  
